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PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS: A CALL FOR
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS*
Joseph J. Nortont
INTRODUCTION
The sustainability of public pension systems' in many
OECD and non-OECD nations is at a critical junction. After
years of maturation and purported financial stability, many
OECD nations are implementing or considering the implemen-
tation of major reforms to their public pension systems, and
many non-OECD nations are addressing fundamental legisla-
© 1998 Joseph J. Norton. All Rights Reserved.
S.J.D, D. Phil (Oxon); Sir John Lubbock Professor of Banking Law, Centre
for Commercial Law Studies, University of London; James L. Walsh Distinguished
Faculty Fellow and Professor of Financial Institution Law, SMU School of Law,
Dallas, Texas; Vice Chancellor's Distinguished Visiting University Professor of Law,
University of Hong Kong (1999-2000). This Article is a significantly expanded
version of comments and analysis provided as a panelist on the Symposium,
Getting Ready For Individually Managed Pensions: A Global Perspective, held at
the Brooklyn Law School (September 17-18, 1998). This Article is intended to
provide a broad review of the subject matter therein and responsibility for all
errors or omissions remain with the author. The author wishes to acknowledge
with deepest appreciation the invaluable research efforts provided by Mr.
Christopher Olive, Research Fellow in International Financial Law at the London
Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law.
1 The fundamental concept of public pension systems necessarily developed
from the respective political, economic, and social environments of nations when
the mitigation of extreme poverty was a fundamental preoccupation of leading
nations. The concept of Social Security, with the inherent social insurance element,
was acknowledged across the globe in various conventions and declarations as a
basic human right. The concept of Social Security first appeared as a fundamental
protection of workers and their families against risks inherent in their social envi-
ronment initially in the Preamble to the ILO Constitution in 1919. The approach
was enhanced by the 1O Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944 and the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The basic principles of
Social Security were articulated in significant ILO Conventions and Recommenda-
tions during 1944-1988, and simultaneously in the European Code of Social Securi-
ty adopted by the Council of Europe in 1964, and revised in 1990.
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tion reform in this area. The principal factor which dominates
pension reform considerations is the effects of systematic age-
ing of national populations on public pension systems.2 For
example, most OECD nations are facing rapid increases in the
proportion of retired persons to the worker population, reflect-
ing a combination of the post-war "baby boom" generation,
increasing longevity, and declining birth rates. Most public
pension systems were designed many years ago when people
did not live as long and pension obligations were generally not
as high as in modern times, and there was much less likeli-
hood of pension system imbalances between contributions re-
ceived from the worker population and payouts to the retired
population. Although the same pattern of changing demograph-
ics in ageing populations generally holds across most OECD
nations, there are clear differences among nations in terms of
the speed with which such changes are likely to occur.
The ageing patterns in OECD nations are somewhat dif-
ferent from those of most non-OECD nations, which will typi-
cally experience accelerating ageing of populations in the form
of falling dependency ratios over later decades.3 In attempting
to sustain current public pension systems, the OECD nations
inevitably face considerable pressures on tax and spending
systems, and declining national savings, resulting in upward
pressure on real interest rates and reduced capital accumula-
2 The populations of many OECD and non-OECD nations have been ageing
gradually for some time, and the ageing trend is widely expected to accelerate
over the next several decades, as shown by the continuously increasing proportion
of retired persons to the working age population in most nations (the "dependency
ratio"). The acceleration of ageing is a function of falling and/or low birth rates
coupled with increased longevity (longer life expectancy) for retired persons. This
trend underscores the fact that challenges regarding the ageing population will be
the dominant issue motivating pension reform. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION AND DEV. ("OECD"), AGEING IN OECD COUNTRIES (1996) [hereinaf-
ter AGEING].
2 See Dave Turner et al., The Macroeconomic Implications of Ageing in a Glob-
al Context, in AGEING WORKING PAPERS: MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING
SOCIETY: THE OECD STUDY ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING, Ageing
Working Paper 1.2, at 6 (1998) (examining the likely domestic and international
macroeconomic effects of varying degrees of ageing across OECD nations and the
implications on international flows between OECD and non-OECD regions). The
term "dependency ratio" is generally defined to be the ratio of the population not
beyond working age (young and old) to those who are beyond working age. Id. at
6 n.2.
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tion and growth.' The predictable policy responses necessarily
include fiscal consolidation, reductions in public spending,
incentives to increase national savings, and other necessary
changes to existing social safety net systems to reduce or avoid
expected increases in public debt from increasing public pen-
sion obligations during the 2010-2030 period.5
The consequences of universally ageing populations in
OECD nations are not necessarily confined to the OECD na-
tions themselves, however, as many of the largest and most
productive non-OECD nations are undergoing similar transi-
tions. Moreover, the growth prospects of other non-OECD
nations with slower ageing populations will depend on the
conditions of OECD nations and international trade in world
financial markets.6 Similarly, the consequences of ageing ef-
fects on OECD and non-OECD nations are not necessarily
limited to the national economies of the respective nations. The
differential changes in national savings and investment bal-
ances will have significant implications for international capi-
tal flows of goods and financial services between nations and
regions, and these implications will likely become apparent in
exchange rates and balance of payments dispositions. The
degree of such changes will also have significant implications
for global savings and investment balances and, by implication,
on global interest rates. Notwithstanding the chronic
underfunding problems generated by ageing populations, there
are other factors influencing the necessity for public pension
system reform. These other factors include the following: (1)
globalization of financial markets and economies; (2) changes
in labor market conditions,7 family structures,8 and other so-
See id. at 20.
The pension systems having a greater range of adequate funding for future
pension commitments resulting from the acceleration in ageing populations will
have an easier time meeting such commitments, as opposed to the more expansive
pension systems and/or systems that are not quite mature that will experience
ballooning pension expenditures.
6 Examining the macroeconomic consequences of ageing populations for a sin-
gle economy is inherently problematic as the evidence shows that most of the
major economies will experience major demographic changes in the next several
decades. Thus, the process for adjustment of any single economy must depend on
the extent to which ageing is occurring relative to other nations and regions. See
Turner et al., supra note 3, at 19.
Labor market conditions have changed dramatically over the past several de-
cades, and high or otherwise persistent unemployment is a common characteristic
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
cial safety net costs into global challenges to pension arrange-
ments; and (3) the growth of population and economic sectors
that are largely uncovered by existing pension schemes
Thus, the ageing of populations will have significant ef-
fects on both OECD and non-OECD nations alike.10 The
OECD and non-OECD nations must act to limit exposures to
future public pension obligations which exceed contributions
and thereby obtain increased capacity to direct funds to other
social safety net problems that could develop in the future."
These policy actions should parallel other regulatory and su-
pervisory reforms which promote greater efficiency and produc-
tivity growth, increased transparency, competition, and macro-
economic stability. The dynamic gains from these actions
should have a positive effect on the ability to counter losses
from the ageing crisis. The timing of relevant pension reforms
is critical, as fiscal measures such as reducing pension benefits
or increasing the age of pension eligibility will necessarily
cause political debate and difficulties in reaching consensus,
especially in nations with higher levels of unemployment. 2
among OECD and non-OECD nations. Notably, widespread unemployment is creat-
ing serious pension funding difficulties in many of the Eastern European nations
in transition where many participants are accessing pension benefits simultaneous-
ly as unemployment has been increasing and thereby reducing pension contribu-
tions. In addition to unemployment, the average employment tenure is generally
becoming less robust, and increasing proportions of working populations are expect-
ed to encounter periods of unemployment which can affect the accumulation of
pension rights, particularly for older men. See David W. Kalisch & Tetsuya Aman,
Retirement Income Systems: The Reform Process Across OECD Countries, in AGEING
WORKING PAPERS: MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY: THE OECD
STUDY ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING, Ageing Working Paper 3.4, at 3
(1998).
' There are various sociodemographic trends existing in OECD nations involv-
ing changes to family structures. These trends include, but are not limited to, the
economic independence and increasing participation of women in the labor force
and pension systems and the extent to which children care for their parents and
thus enter the labor force at increasingly younger ages. See id. at 21.
' See Jean-Victor Gruat, Adequacy and Social Security Principles in Pension
Reform, in AGEING WORKING PAPERS: MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SO-
CIETY: THE OECD STUDY ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING, Ageing Work-
ing Paper 3.1, at 3 (1998).
10 See Turner et al., supra note 3, at 6.
n The OECD nations likely to experience the greatest pressures first include
Japan, where the ageing process is most advanced, and thereafter include the
European Union and the United States over the next 50 years. See id. at 8.
12 See id. at 25.
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The postponement of policy action because of political uncer-
tainties or otherwise risks the necessity of introducing more
dramatic but otherwise inevitable reforms in later years. Thus,
the commencement of early dialogue is essential to carry
through the inevitable political debate and otherwise give
citizens sufficient time to adjust to forthcoming changes in
public pension schemes."
In 1994, the pension reform options available were set
forth in an analysis of ageing populations by the World
Bank.14 The World Bank personnel argued that income securi-
ty in retirement should reside in a combination of three dis-
tinct "pillars" to include traditional pay-as-you-go ("PAYG")
public pension systems (first pillar); compulsory funded
schemes premised on defined contributions (second pillar); and
voluntary defined benefit schemes (third pillar). The current or
planned public pension system reforms generally envision new
distributions of duties and responsibilities between the respec-
tive national government and its citizens as part of an inte-
grated economic and social approach to the "social safety net"
system. Such envisioning is viewed in the context of increased
competition in the global markets, deregulation in labor mar-
kets, and the desire for maximizing value for pension partici-
pant benefits juxtaposed against minimizing fiscal pressures to
the nation.
Many reform strategies in the leading OECD nations con-
centrate on the first pillar: changes to current public pension
systems to render them financially sustainable over the
medium- or long-term by reducing pension benefits or increas-
ing contributions without altering the overall structure. The
more dramatic reforms generally attempt to add the second
and/or third pillars to currently existing PAYG systems, or
otherwise abolish the PAYG system and implement the second
and/or third pillar(s), respectively, in order to strengthen the
13 The internal consistency of the chosen reform method and the consistency of
the method to the overall economic and social policy framework in the individual
nation is critical to sustain reform and implement adopted strategies. The building
of consensus, with particular focus remaining on income security, must remain as
the key focus of political debate. The other effects of pension reform on capital
markets, financial sector infrastructure, or privatization should be maintained as
subordinated but nonetheless important objectives of pension reform.
4 See generally WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS (1994).
1998]
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linkages between private contributions and prospective bene-
fits of currently existing public pension systems. 5 Thus, the
policy implications include ensuring a closer relationship be-
tween pension systems and social needs, strengthening the
relationship between social costs and economic efficiency, and
expanding pension participant choice in selecting the invest-
ment vehicle for their retirement.
16
The public pension system reforms implemented over the
past decade represent a diverse mixture of principles, reflect-
ing the desire to achieve greater levels of protection than un-
der the old systems, the increasing dominance of economic
concerns over social concerns, the promotion of individual se-
lection, and the enhancement of benefits. These principles
generally resulted in the emergence of favorable OECD trends
such as (1) the growth of private sector influence in pension
schemes; (2) the decline of the role of government coupled with
privatization of pension systems; (3) the increased share of
benefits in public pension systems coupled with more stringent
conditions for entitlement; (4) the relative decline of the in-
come replacement element and relative increase in individual
savings elements; and (5) the emergence of supplementary
employer-sponsored pension schemes. 7
Nonetheless, the issue at the forefront of the public pen-
sion reform is unquestionably the medium- and long-term fi-
nancial viability of currently existing public pension systems.
This issue is one of the greatest economic and political dilem-
mas faced by OECD nations at this time. There exists a global
concern among many OECD nations that they should prepare
now for the impact of universal population ageing on public
pension obligations. 8 This concern is directly linked to expect-
" See Keitl Hviding & Marcel Merette, Macroeconomic Effects of Pension Re-
forms in the Context of Ageing Populations: Overlapping Generations Model Simula-
tions for Seven OECD Countries, in AGEING WORKING PAPERS: MAINTAINING PROS-
PERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY: THE OECD STUDY ON THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
AGEING, Ageing Working Paper 1.3, at 4 (1998) (analyzing macroeconomic effects of
different types of pension reforms in the context of ageing populations and particu-
larly whether a given pension reform results in a significant reduction in the need
to raise taxes or contributions).
16 See Gruat, supra note 9, at 3.
' See id. at 5.
'8 The United States is no exception, as Social Security reform is now at the
forefront of the political agenda given the widely recognized understanding that
[Vol. 64: 3
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ed changes in the financial condition of public pensions funded
on a PAYG basis and other fiscal pressures, including fiscal
consolidation and the incentive not to overtly restrict govern-
ment budgets in the future in order to meet increasing public
pension obligations. The global concern is also indirectly linked
to issues of how the potential burden of providing funds to
meet increasing public pension obligations should be placed on
future working generations. 9 Other concerns generally raised
by OECD nations include (1) the appropriate effective age for
retirement;" (2) the adequacy of public pension benefit levels,
particularly with respect to Eastern European nations; (3) the
size of the population covered by pension schemes;2' and (4)
the effectiveness of financial incentives inherent in pension
systems for people to work.22 The collective policy approaches
utilized by OECD nations, and otherwise available to address
these concerns, include reducing pension generosity to reduce
the financing pressures associated with the future ageing of
the population; increasing pension benefit levels; increasing
the level of funding for public pension schemes; and adopting
policies to change the effective age of retirement.'
The alternative approach to modifying the currently exist-
ing public pension systems is transitioning from public pension
systems to publicly-regulated, privately-managed defined con-
tribution systems through a gradual or immediate quasi-pri-
vatization process. The process would be supplemented by
establishing or expanding coverage of employer-based or indi-
vidually-based private savings arrangements. The key region
in the world addressing transition to, or wholesale adoption of,
a "private" pension system is Latin America.
the U.S. PAYG system is unsustainable over the long-term. See, e.g., New Direc-
tions in Retirement Income: Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings Bef re
the Senate Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 315-29 (1998) (statement of Kenneth S.
Apfel, Comm'r of Soc. Sec.).
19 See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 22.
20 The long-term trends for declining participation in the labor force of older
men, high displacement of older workers from employment, public benefits encour-
aging early retirement, and greater personal wealth approaching retirement sup-
port this concern. See id.
21 The size enhancements would include extending pension coverage to new
industries or sectors and increased convergence between public pension schemes
and private pension arrangements. See id. at 23.
' See id.
Id. at 24-26.
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Beginning with Chile in 1980-1981 and, thereafter, in Ar-
gentina, Columbia, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Mexico in the
1990s, the "private pension system" approaches have been or
are otherwise currently being considered or implemented in a
number of OECD nations. For instance, the Eastern European
transition nations, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Kazakstan, Bulgaria, and Croatia, will use private pension
systems to supplement public pension benefits without expand-
ing the public schemes. In addition, Poland will rely on the
privately-managed investment earnings of retirement funds to
finance the earnings-related portion of the public pension
scheme and encourage the development of third level retire-
ment benefits through private pensions and voluntary retire-
ment savings accounts. The People's Republic of China, India,
and Russia have also long studied the Chilean model for
piecemeal or wholesale adoption to replace or supplement cur-
rently existing public pension systems. In addition, many na-
tions have adopted employer-sponsored or industry-sponsored
private pension systems,24 and individual retirement savings
accounts with tax incentives, to supplement currently existing
PAYG public pension systems.
As a general proposition, most OECD and non-OECD na-
tions support the concept of establishing publicly-regulated,
privately-managed private pension systems to either replace or
supplement public pension systems. Of course, the political and
economic realities of respective nations may simply not permit
wholesale adoption of such private pension systems at this
time, and the wholesale transition from existing PAYG sys-
tems to private pension systems as an OECD "call to arms"
may be inappropriate.' The policies supporting privatization
24 Under employer-sponsored pension systems, workers are usually protected
through labor laws and regulations whereby affected employers are required to
provide specified payments or services directly to their employees, such as pay-
ment of lump-sum annuities to the aged or disabled; provision of medical care,
paid sick leave, or both; payment of maternity benefits or family allowances; provi-
sion of temporary or long-term cash benefits and medical care in the case of work
injury; or payment of severance indemnities in the case of dismissal or changing
jobs. This approach does not necessarily involve any direct pooling of risk, as
liability for payment is placed directly with the employer without government
guarantee.
25 Notably, the political and economic circumstances in Chile in 1980 clearly
supported the immediate wholesale adoption of the Chilean private pension system
[Vol. 64: 3
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of public pension systems are necessarily dependent on the
development of a suitable regulatory and supervisory frame-
work for privately-managed funds and fund operators to estab-
lish and improve safeguards of retirement funds for contribut-
ing participants. The necessity of establishing a regulatory and
supervisory framework for privately-managed pension systems
is directly. related to the perception or reality that such sys-
tems would achieve higher investment earnings using invest-
ment techniques that may involve greater degrees of risk, as
compared to schemes using risk-averse investment techniques
resulting in lower (or perhaps negative) investment returns."
The development of public pension reform strategies that
are politically, economically, and socially acceptable is a lead-
ing global dilemma, and discussion of the social and political
principles are beyond the scope of this Article. The developing
and transition nations should understand the issues faced by
leading OECD nations with respect to their public pension
systems, and pursue policy actions in advance to preclude or
mitigate these issues from dominating the development of their
own social safety net systems. In particular, this Article advo-
cates for the privatization of public pension systems through
gradual reform and transition of financially unsustainable pub-
lic pension systems to (and/or the adoption of) publicly-regulat-
ed, privately-managed defined contribution schemes as both a
moral responsibility to supplant ageing populations and a nec-
essary component of financial sector reform and develop-
ment." The modern global economy is defined by volatile cap-
without democratic debate and acceptance by consensus. During the transition
from the military government to "democracy," the economic crisis produced under
the government of Salvador Allende still lingered over the economy. There was a
legitimate fear that the return to elected government could bring about the return
of demagoguery, populism, Marxism, and economic collapse. In this climate of
doubt, the Chilean model was one of the elements that served to diffuse these
concerns. The new reality in Chile was abundantly clear: the economic future was
not at risk in the election, as no government could resume the role of controlling
the economy because that role was assumed by the Chilean worker population
through their private pension accounts. See Political and Social Effects in Chile of
that Country's Pension System Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Mark
M. Klugmann, Director, IntVl Ctr. for Pension Reform).
2S See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 25.
Of course, developing and transition nations that do not have public pension
systems but instead rely on social insurance or provident fund arrangements may
1998]
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ital flows, exchange rate instability, and increasing dominance
of developed nation monetary and exchange rate policies on
developing and transition economies. The establishment of
viable private pension systems with limited direct government
involvement as a supplement to, or in replacement of, finan-
cially unsustainable public pension systems is simply critical to
avoid breakdowns in the overall social safety net system. In
other words, developed and developing nations must either es-
tablish or transition to viable and modern private pension
systems to protect both their ageing populations and fiscal
balances from the effects of global financial instability and
periodic banking and currency crises that will likely continue
to plague financial markets and developing nations into the
indefinite future. The revision or elimination of public pension
systems given these global trends should be considered a mat-
ter of national security and a policy objective to approach with
vigor and intellect. The important concept is that governments
recognize that income security of ageing populations is a key
moral and political objective. The guaranteed provision of in-
come security to the elderly cannot be jeopardized by banking
crises, currency crises, and other financial crises that dramati-
cally affect the monetary and fiscal policies of governments.
This Article provides a limited introduction to the various
issues and concepts that should be recognized by developing
and transition nations in considering pension reforms. In
particular, this Article advocates for the establishment of pri-
vate pension systems premised on the Chilean model and the
development of international regulatory and supervisory stan-
dards to facilitate this transition. Part I of this Article reviews
the OECD public pension schemes funded by payroll taxes and
emphasizes that the larger, mature PAYG pension systems are
generally becoming financially unsustainable. The PAYG pen-
sion system as a matter of policy is simply becoming less desir-
able in the modern global economy characterized by financial
instability and developing capital markets. Part II reviews the
Chilean experience and urges developing and transition na-
tions with currently existing PAYG systems to establish a
privatization process and transition from the old PAYG sys-
undertake a more immediate transition to publicly-regulated privately-managed
private pension systems.
[Vol. 64: 3
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tems to, or supplement such systems with, publicly-regulated,
privately-managed defined contribution systems. Such systems
would permit workers the option of participating in the eco-
nomic development of their own nation and the global economy
in general. For developing and transition nations that do not
have PAYG systems, the wholesale adoption of private pension
systems is urged as the appropriate course of action. Part III of
this Article reviews guiding principles in conducting the transi-
tion process but emphasizes that the path selected to finance
the inevitable fiscal deficits resulting from transition must be
individually tailored to the economic and political environment
situation of each nation with respect to its position in the glob-
al economy. Finally, Part IV of this Article advocates for the
development of international regulatory and supervisory stan-
dards for publicly-regulated, privately-managed pension sys-
tems along the lines of standards developed primarily by the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO").
I. OECD TRENDS IN PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS2"
A. Public Pension Systems: An Overview
The public pension systems in OECD nations play a signif-
icant role in their respective economies. In general, nearly all
OECD nations, and many other non-OECD nations, have pub-
lic pension systems to provide income security for ageing popu-
lations, although the historical development of these systems
are quite different." Since the inception of public pension sys-
tems, most nations developed their systems by increasing the
degree of benefits and scope of coverage. These general trends
continued in OECD member nations until the oil price shocks
in the early 1970s.3"
2" In Section I of this Article, the author relies principally on the extensive
research and review of public pension system principles set forth in Kalisch &
Aman, supra note 7.
29 See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 5.
30 See id.
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The public pension system is generally the single largest
social safety net benefit in most OECD nations, notwithstand-
ing those nations compromised by significant labor market
issues and high unemployment benefit costs. This observation
is underscored by the larger number of retired persons com-
pared to unemployed persons, the long average duration of
pension payouts per participant, and, in some instances, the
generous benefits compared to other "social safety net" bene-
fits.3' The public pension schemes also significantly contribute
to OECD economies, consisting of between 6 and 10 percent of
gross domestic product ("GDP") in most OECD nations. The
implementation of sudden changes in public pension expendi-
tures would likely have a significant impact on domestic con-
sumption and economic activity, notwithstanding the direct
impact on pension participants.32 Moreover, the public pen-
sion systems are generally complex, with multiple tiers of obli-
gations, rules, and regulations attached to both public and pri-
vate tiers and interconnections between these tiers. The OECD
pension systems are faced with a number of economic, demo-
graphic, and social challenges in modern times. The principal
issue facing most OECD nations is ensuring the medium- to
long-term viability of currently existing public pension sys-
tems. The related concerns include the adequacy of pension
benefits, improving the coverage of pension schemes, and im-
proving work-related incentives in pension schemes.33
In the OECD, it is generally accepted given the ageing
populations that most existing PAYG public pension systems
are financially unsustainable over the long-term. As the age-
ing process- accelerates in given populations, they will require
substantial reform to prevent large public sector deficits and
reductions in national aggregate savings rates.34 The prob-
lems of income security are primarily due to changing demo-
graphics and structural unemployment. Many OECD nations
are actively pursuing pension reform agendas, but these agen-
das generally focus on tinkering with the public pension model
by increasing the level of contributions and/or employment
" See id.
32 See id.
See id.
34 See, e.g., SHEETAL K. CHAND & ALBERT JAEGER, AGEING POPULATIONS AND
PUBLIC PENSION SCHEMES (IMF Occasional Paper No. 147, 1996).
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history required to generate given levels of benefits and chang-
es to qualifying retirement ages. Many OECD nations are also
reducing or eliminating existing financial incentives for early
retirement. Perhaps most importantly, greater emphasis is
being placed on private pension arrangements to diversify
away from public pension schemes and otherwise supplement
public benefits. The common theme of these efforts is that
pension reform is generally phased in over a substantial period
of years.35 Thus, OECD nations must continually and ade-
quately respond to arising challenges to their pension systems.
Public pension systems are generally either managed en-
tirely by government entities or with significant national coor-
dination. The public pension systems with significant national
coordination based on PAYG principles may be considered
"public pension systems" even though actual pension funds
may be privately managed. 6 The concept inherent in nearly
all PAYG pension systems is that current pension revenue
(either current tax revenues or current contributions) from the
working population are expected to finance current pension
benefits to the retired population. The national payroll tax is
the standard source of financing for PAYG systems." The rate
of the payroll tax is adjusted occasionally to ensure that reve-
nues and expenditures balance, and reserves are maintained
generally to finance temporary or cyclical decreases in revenue.
Any prior contributions of the current retired population are
generally not recycled as benefits at a later date.38 With re-
spect to fully mature PAYG systems with a long payment his-
tory, the contributions of the current retired population funded
the retirement pensions of the previous generations of retired
persons. With respect to relatively immature PAYG schemes
(that have been recently developed or augmented), the current
See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 4.
'6 The pension systems, managed by private employer corporations with the
role of a public institution generally limited to regulation and supervision, and
individually-managed personal retirement savings accounts are generally known as
uprivate pensions." These systems are separate and distinct from the privatized
pension systems that represent the focus of this Article, such as the publicly-regu-
lated privately-managed defined contribution scheme adopted by Chile in 1980 and
those systems adopted in various forms by other nations.
' See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 11.
38 See generally MACKENZIE ET AL., PENSION REGIMES AND SAVING (IMF Occa-
sional Paper No. 153, 1997).
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retired population may be receiving higher benefits without the
burden of funding during their employment more generous
benefits to the previously retired population." Thus, in PAYG
systems, the worker population contributions generally support
the pension payments of the current retired population and
establish the future pension rights of the contributors.
Notably, these contributions do not fund the pensions of
contributors, although contributors may mistakenly believe
they have entered into a contract for future delivery of pension
benefit payouts under given conditions. 0 In many OECD na-
tions, the worker contributions, in and of themselves, already
do not cover the full cost of current public pension obligations,
such as in Germany, Canada, Spain, Sweden, and Belgium;
this trend is expected to increase given the acceleration of
ageing in populations of other OECD nations.4' The worker
contributions generally resemble taxes collected for a defined
purpose, such as for flat-rate pensions or health care assess-
ments. However, the resulting revenues collected are not nec-
essarily limited for use only for that purpose, which is sup-
plemented by general sources of revenue to pay the entire set
of pension obligations.4 In other OECD nations, such as Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, there are no individual contributions
to the public pension system, and all pension payouts are gen-
erated from general tax revenues.43 The vast majority of
PAYG systems are defined benefit systems, which generally
define plan participant benefits as a function of salary and
work history."
'9 See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 12.
, See id.
41 See id.
42 See id.
See id.
Defined contribution systems generally do not define the benefit, as plan
participants obtain their contributions upon retirement plus an accumulated re-
turn, with the pension benefit represented by one lump-sum payment or a series
of lump-sum payments (an annuity). The Chilean model and provident fund model
represent notable defined contribution systems. The defined contribution plan is
per se fully funded, and the eventual pension benefit is a function of the perfor-
mance of contribution investments.
[Vol. 64: 3
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B. Funding of Public Pension Systems
Public pension systems may be categorized as either un-
funded, partially funded, or fully funded PAYG systems. Most
OECD nations maintain public pension systems that are either
unfunded or partially funded PAYG systems (such as Ja-
pan),45 but a number of nations such as Canada and Sweden
maintain fully funded PAYG systems.46 The partially funded
and fully funded PAYG systems are generally intended to
enhance retirement income security." The increased reliance
on partially or fully funded PAYG systems has become neces-
sary as nations have expanded their retirement income provi-
sions without financing the expanded pension obligations from
the national budgets during the initial phases of the newly ex-
panded systems. These new provisions are premised on the
basis that future pension obligations will be matched by avail-
able contributions through funded pension schemes.4" The
notion that partially or fully funded PAYG systems necessarily
contribute to higher national savings and economic growth are
subject to competing conclusions, however.49 Nonetheless, oth-
er nations perceive the continuation of PAYG funding as im-
portant and adjust benefits and/or contributions to achieve
greater balance in funding, such as in Germany and Japan."
In partially or fully funded PAYG pension systems, there
is a direct relationship between pension payments and partic-
ipant contributions. Many funded PAYG systems render pay-
ments which rely on the long-term investment performance of
the specific contributions. The directness of the relationship be-
tween pension payouts and contributions, coupled with the
general absence of additional liability for the government in
question, may augment the attractiveness of this option. This
option generally imposes all risks on the contributors them-
4 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 6.
" See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 12.
4 In "funded PAYG systems", the payroll tax rate is generally set at a begin-
ning level to ensure that the plan will always be self-financing and no increase in
the rate is required.
48 See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 12.
See id. at 12 n.16.
See id. at 12-13.
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selves and, indirectly, on the fund managers; however, and the
government effectively does not share in the risk of providing
future pension payments.5
C. Flat-Rate versus Earnings-Related Public Pension Systems
Public pension benefits may also be either flat-rate or
earnings-related, or flat-rate with an earnings-related element,
such as in Japan and the United Kingdom.52 At least twenty-
five OECD member nations have flat-rate public pension sys-
tems which vary widely in terms of design and parameters"
and are generally intended to provide minimum income securi-
ty. The flat-rate public pension system funding is based on
either payroll taxes54 or contributions, 5 and eligibility re-
quirements are generally premised on parameters such as age,
length of in-country residence, and other objective and subjec-
tive means tests.55 While OECD nations demonstrate a wide
variety of features respecting the funding and entitlement
schemes, the age of pension recognition is generally 65 years,
and most eligibility requirements are linked to residence peri-
ods and other means tests. In most OECD nations, the respec-
" See id. at 13. The fully or partially funded pension option is far more com-
mon to private pension systems, where opportunities to utilize alternative financ-
ing sources, if contributions do not cover payments at later dates, are more limit-
ed. See id.
52 Japan and the United Kingdom have vastly different flat-rate pension
schemes than other nations. The flat-rate schemes are considered the primary
pension, but elderly persons cannot receive this benefit if they do not accumulate
contributions before reaching the age of retirement. See id. at 8.
u See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 8.
5 Some nations have flat-rate basic pension schemes funded by general taxa-
tion but separate from other social safety net schemes, such as Canada, Denmark,
and New Zealand. See id.
" The Nordic nations (except for Denmark) and the Netherlands have flat-rate
pension schemes that accept contributions but do not require prior contributions in
providing benefits to participants. Mhile this scheme is different from pension
schemes that do require contributions, similar in that there is no actual linkage
between the contribution and benefit. These schemes generally require a length of
residence in the respective nation but do not impose other means tests for receipt
of benefits. Denmark has a contribution-based pension scheme that provides bene-
fits linked to the participant's history of contributions rather than earning as a
supplementary pension to that of the basic fiat-rate pension scheme. See id. at 8.
56 See id. at 7.
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tive government is responsible for the entire cost of the pen-
sion scheme, and in contributory schemes the government
generally covers funding deficits.57
The entire range of OECD nations (except for Australia,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand) utilize some form
of earnings-related public pension system.58 The earnings-
related public pension system is generally intended to raise
income security to a higher level.59 In nations with flat-rate
public pension systems, earnings-related systems often serve
as a second tier to the overall structure of the respective pen-
sion programs. The benefits are related to income earned be-
fore retirement, and the funding is contribution-based and/or
augmented by subsidies from the national government." The
eligibility requirements are generally premised on the length of
employment or vesting period in which the participant renders
contributions."' The methodologies utilized to determine final
benefit payouts according to previous earnings vary widely.
The benefits formulae are generally complex but normally
include the amount of average earnings, length of coverage,
and level of contributions rendered by the participant as domi-
nant variables therein. Many earnings-related pension
57 See id. at 9.
", See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 9. The majority of these nations set
the age of retirement at 65 years for men, while in some transitional nations the
age is lower than 65, and a significant minority of nations set different ages be-
tween men and women. See id. at 9.
", "Defined contribution systems" are only indirectly earnings-related, as the
contributions and return on investments determine the benefits, not the earnings
histories of the participants. As contributions are generally a function of partici-
pant earnings, however, defined contribution systems are generally included as
earnings-related pension schemes.
' See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 7. Some nations require full or partial
retirement before benefit payouts commence. Other nations, such as the Czech
Republic, Finland, and Spain, permit ongoing employment coupled with receipt of
pension payout after reaching the age of retirement (although the benefit may be
reduced to reflect the increased level of earned income, as it is in the United
States). See id. at 9.
61 See id. at 7. All OECD nations require a minimum vesting period, represent-
ed either by duration of employment or contribution or coverage in other nations.
See id. at 10.
2 See id. at 10. There are earnings-related pension schemes which premise the
final payment on a percentage of average earnings over the entire history of con-
tributions, as in Japan, while other nations account for average earnings over part
of the coverage period, as in France (10 year period), and the United Kingdom (20
year period). Other nations, such as Greece, Hungary, Portugal, and Turkey, use
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schemes also have an income redistribution element in the
benefit determination, except for those schemes that maintain
solely earnings-related benefits, unless the replacement ratio
(ratio of pension to salary) has an inverse relationship to in-
come level, as most have some combination of minimum and
maximum pensions and contribution levels. The income redis-
tribution elements generally skew the benefit amounts to pro-
vide increased replacement rates for prior lower-income earn-
ing participants and further limit the level of public earnings-
related benefits available to participants earning higher levels
of income.63
D. Indexation of Public Pension Benefits
The indexation of public pension benefits generally varies
among OECD nations between two separate methods, either by
changes in price inflation or wage growth. The OECD nations
generally increase benefit payout rates according to (1) changes
in inflation to maintain pension purchasing power, such as the
United States and Sweden; (2) changes in wage movements,
such as Germany and Austria; or (3) both, such as Finland and
multiple steps to determine payout benefits. Initially, average earnings drawn
from the latest and/or best 5-10 years of earnings history are used; then a sepa-
rate step accounts for all or a part of the remaining number of coverage and/or
contributory years. Other nations first utilize a base amount determined by the
government which is then multiplied by a scheme of "pension points" for each
individual calculated on the basis of earnings, length of coverage, contributions and
other factors, as done in Germany and Sweden. Finally, some nations, such as
Canada, deliberately exclude a number of low or no earnings periods from the
benefits calculation, or otherwise include certain periods spent unemployed or oth-
erwise caring for children or family members for purposes of determining pension
payouts, as in Finland, Belgium, and Switzerland. See id.
63 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 6; Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7,
at 10. For instance, some nations impose a maximum limit on final benefits, such
as Canada and Italy; a maximum limit on earnings in the determination of final
benefits without limitation on prior contributions based on earnings, such as the
Czech Republic; a minimum benefit amount or fixed variable in the determination
added together with an earnings-related variable, such as Switzerland and Luxem-
bourg; a minimum wage level for accepting contributions while taking such periods
into account for the determination of benefits, such as Canada; supplementing the
pension benefit up to a minimum level for all participants meeting the qualifying
contributory period, such as Italy; and differential weightings allocated to prior
earnings in the middle to low income ranges compared to higher earnings, such as
the United States. See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 10.
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Austria." The United States and several other nations offer
full indexation to the consumer price index ("CPI). 65 Addi-
tionally, flat-rate public pension schemes may also have an
indexation component, such as in Australia and the Nether-
lands.66
E. Replacement Ratio
The replacement ratio (ratio of pension to some measure of
income earned during the contribution period) should be estab-
lished in a defined benefits plan as a promise to be honored by
the public sector, while in the defined contributions plan the
ratio by definition cannot be guaranteed as it is solely earn-
ings-related. The International Labor Organization ("ILO")
Convention No. 102, established in 1952, recommends that
public pension schemes ensure a replacement ratio of at least
40 percent, and the Council of Europe adopted a similar stan-
dard in the European Code of Social Security.68 Most OECD
nations generally meet the ILO Convention recommendation,
and many nations provide replacement ratios far above the
recommendation level in the range of 60-80 percent, such as in
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Korea.69 No-
tably, many OECD nations with low public pension replace-
ment ratios in fact have significant replacement ratios upon
inclusion of private pension schemes that are not otherwise
reflected in the aforementioned percentages.7"
F. Taxation of Retirement Income
Most OECD nations provide tax incentives and concessions
for public pension participants from liability for income tax,
property tax, capital gains taxes, and other taxes. The tax
" See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 11.
See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 6.
See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 11 n.11.
7 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 6.
6 See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 11.
" See id.
'0 See id.
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benefits generally include pension benefits as excluded from
income taxation, the provision of income tax credits, and spe-
cial tax deductions and tax exemptions.71
G. Macroeconomic Implications
The macroeconomic implications of public pension systems
generally depend upon the size of the system, which in turn
depends upon the extent of the coverage (such as the share of
the working age population eligible to contribute) and the
maturity of the system. The maturity of the system is defined
by the degree to which the system has reached its full size or
the long-term dependency ratio (ratio of pensioners to contribu-
tors) premised on whether the current population of retired
persons has contributed long enough, or at all, to qualify for
full pension benefits. The plans of most developed nations
generally maintain universal coverage and are already fully
mature plans."
One of the most important macroeconomic implications is
the impact of the public pension system on national aggregate
savings. Studies of the U.S. economy, on which most research
has been conducted, provide evidence that the introduction and
development of the public pension systems has generally de-
creased private aggregate savings, although the extent of this
decrease is difficult to quantify. The studies of other econo-
mies, however, tend to be inconclusive.73 Studies of the U.S.
economy and other economies suggest that the growth and
development of private pension schemes, on the other hand,
increase private sector savings, in that savings decrease by
less than contractual pension plan savings increase.74 The
studies also indicate that replacing the PAYG pension schemes
with a Chilean-type ("DCP") scheme may increase aggregate
savings, but the critical components are the contribution rates
of such plans and the method used to finance the increase in
public sector deficits that generally emerge during the transi-
tion period in which the PAYG scheme is phased out.75 In or-
71 See id. at 15.
72 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 6.
73 See id. at 1.
74 See id. at 2.
"' See id.
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der to maximize the impact on savings, the public sector deficit
established as workers cease rendering payroll taxes and begin
rendering private sector contributions should be financed
through high contribution rates and tax increases or the tem-
porary maintenance of payroll taxes.7"
H. Regional Trends in Developing Nation Public Pension
Systems
The global trend of pension reform is in manifest in OECD
and non-OECD developing nations alike. As a general proposi-
tion, the traditional PAYG systems in developing nations have
been managed far more inefficiently and are closer to financial
insolvency than in developed nations. The relatively more ad-
vanced nations of East Asia and Latin America are about to
experience, and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe
have already experienced, the same ageing population, chang-
ing demographics problems and chronic underfunding problems
inherent to the developed nations. In Latin America, notwith-
standing the extensive public pension system reforms that
have occurred throughout that region in the past decade, there
is great concern about the budgetary costs of enormously gen-
erous public benefits, the erosion of the payroll tax base, bu-
reaucratic waste, and inequitable coverage and treatment
among sectors of the population in nations that have not
adopted reforms to date.
The OECD and non-OECD nations have, through various
means, effectively increased contribution rates in their PAYG
plans, which have resulted in unsustainable levels of payroll
taxes, increased government subsidies to stabilize the systems,
and gradual reductions in benefit levels. The use of high pay-
roll taxes to fund PAYG pension systems is unfortunately quite
common in the OECD and acutely problematic in Eastern
Europe, the Baltics, Russia, and other nations of the former
Soviet Union (collectively referred to herein as "transition
nations"). In Central and Eastern Europe, transition nations
are struggling with the combination of high western European
rates of ageing and with low post-Communist incomes. In addi-
tion, early retirement following the collapse of communist
' See id.
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regimes has pushed the pension burden to problematic levels.
The reform of public pension systems is a critical function of
social safety net reform for such nations in transition, which
are largely based on the PAYG defined benefits scheme in
place before transition.
The PAYG systems in transition nations are largely fi-
nanced through payroll tax contributions, as supplemented by
budgetary transfers, and administered by quasi-government
pension funds. The contribution methods are generally
redistributive in nature, defined by high contribution rates,
small employment bases, and increasing dependency ratios
relative to other OECD nations. Moreover, the benefits eligibil-
ity frameworks are generally wide-ranging, with special
schemes for specified occupations, complex benefits formulae,
broad eligibility criteria, low retirement ages, and indirect
linkages to contributions (at best).7" The transition process has
generally resulted in the pension systems of transition nations
coming under increased pressure due to increases in the ratio
of participants to contributors and systematically reduced tax
compliance. The initial attempts at reform through reduction
in benefits and raising of payroll taxes has resulted in signifi-
cant labor market distortions and otherwise harmed the ability
to maintain adequate social safety net structures.78 Thus, the
concepts of early retirement (and disability pensions) have
been used in certain central and eastern European transition
nations to augment the social safety net and mitigate unem-
ployment. 9
With respect to East Asia, compulsory retirement savings
programs (known generally as "provident funds") were intro-
duced by Singapore and Malaysia 0 and are representative
77 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 114, Box
10 (1998) [hereinafter WORLD OUTLOOK]; see also EMILY S. ANDREWS & MANSOORA
RASHID, THE FINANCING OF PENSION SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR TREND AND THEIR DETERMINANTS (World Bank Technical
Paper No. 339, 1996).
78 See WORLD OUTLOOK, supra note 77, at 114, Box 10.
79 See WORLD OUTLOOK, supra note 77, at 114, Box 10.
80 For instance, the Government of Singapore established the Central Provident
Fund ("CPF") in 1955. The CPF is a fully funded individual account system with
both lump-sum and annuity payouts and without a redistributive element. The
CPF covers nearly 75% of the population. The contribution rates in 1994 were 20%
for employers and employees and capped at a monthly salary level of U.S. $6,000
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throughout the region.8' These programs have unfortunately
largely resulted in government monopolies that continue to
invest the majority of fund participant assets in government
instruments and otherwise exert firm control over their respec-
tive national economies. Currently, the Singapore/Malaysia
example is being followed by the new government in Thailand,
which recently announced plans to introduce a compulsory 10
percent pension fund tax on civil servants, employees of state-
owned enterprises ("SOEs"), and workers in large corporations.
Moreover, in China, the need to shift the public pension
burden from already financially distressed SOEs and the de-
sire to improve the banking and financial systems has made
pension reform an important issue. China faces a serious com-
bination of interrelated and potentially disastrous problems.
The nation's state-owned banks are largely insolvent, leaving
them unable to fund the restructuring of SOEs which cannot
uphold promises of lifetime welfare support for its citizens, and
the ratio of workers to pensioners is projected to decline seri-
ously in the next century. The primary task is to mobilize the
nation's household savings of more than $110 billion or 13
percent of GDP into institutional investment vehicles that can
(about U.S. $4,000). The government does not provide contributions, except in the
capacity as an employer. Singapore law requires that nearly all of the assets of
the CPF are invested in government bonds, and the proceeds of government bond
sales are invested in foreign financial assets. Upon reaching the retirement age of
55, participants may withdraw as a lump sum all but a fixed amount which is
used to finance a fixed monthly pension payable at age 60. The starting amount
of this pension is indexed to the CPI; the pension for the participant is not in-
dexed once it begins and ceases once the individual receives the fixed sum and
accumulated interest. The withdrawal privileges have been increasingly expanded
since 1968 for housing, medical, education, and insurance purposes and investing
in certain types of assets. The employee contributions and withdrawals, and inter-
est earnings on participant balances, are excluded from income taxation. See
MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 13, Box 2; see also Aasim M. Husain, Deter-
minants of Private Saving in Singapore, in SINGAPORE: A CASE STUDY IN RAPID
DEVELOPMENT (IMF Occasional Paper No. 119, 1995).
"I Public provident funds exist primarily in developing nations as compulsory
savings programs in which regular contributions withheld from employees' wages
are matched by their employers. These contributions are set aside for each em-
ployee in a special fund for later repayment to the worker (generally in a single
lump sum with interest) when defined contingencies occur, although in a few in-
stances the beneficiary may select a pension payout or pensions are otherwise
provided for survivors.
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provide for retirements by investing some of these funds into
restructuring or privatized SOEs. In other words, social safety
net reform is closely linked to SOE reform.
The State Commission for Restructuring the Economy is
currently spearheading pension reform. At the IMF/World
Bank annual meeting in Hong Kong in September 1997, China
disclosed its plan for a new pension system, consisting of indi-
vidually funded accounts and supplementary corporate pen-
sions. The private initiatives are to be coupled with a national
mandatory Social Security system administered by local, mu-
nicipal, and provincial government authorities and SOEs. The
World Bank's review of pension reform in China, released in
September 1997, observes that the fragmented public pension
system consists of widely different contribution rates and pool-
ing schemes across the nation. In the private sector, very few
Chinese-owned conglomerates and foreign multinational corpo-
rations offer well-managed supplementary pension schemes for
their employees. The World Bank, therefore, recommended
that China implement a three pillar pension system: (1) a basic
pension to keep retirees above the poverty line; (2) large man-
datory individual accounts; and (3) supplementary voluntary
accounts. The supplementary pension schemes must become
the focal point of pension reform, providing market models for
state-sector asset managers to follow and enhancing both the
fund management capabilities and the capital markets of Chi-
na. Thus, with the emergence of pension and medical care
system reforms, fund management will undoubtedly become
quite important to China in the near future.
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II. THE CHILEAN MODEL: STATE-REGULATED PRIVATELY-
MANAGED DEFINED CONTRIBUTIONS SYSTEMS
8 2
A. Introduction
In 1980, Chile replaced its PAYG pension system with a
mandatory privately-managed system of Pension Savings Ac-
counts ("PSAs"). The new system went into operation in May
1981. Upon sixteen years of operation, the pensions in the new
private system are 50 to 100 percent higher than under the
PAYG system, depending on the type of pension (old age, dis-
ability, survivor pensions). The resources administered under
the private pension system amount to nearly 42 percent of
Chilean GNP. The pension privatization is a key initiative
that, in connection with other financial sector reforms, has
increased Chilean economic growth rates from 3 percent per
year to over 7 percent per year over the last twelve years.'
The Chilean model advocates the complete removal of
public pension funds from government control in order to be
privately managed by smaller fund managers but regulated
and supervised by the government within appropriate guide-
lines. Thus, the pension funds act as quasi-mutual funds and
provide participants with higher rates of return.
B. Participants and Contributions
The participant's pension level is determined by the
amount of money accumulated during the working years. The
participant and the employer do not pay a Social Security tax
to the state, and the worker does not collect a government-
funded pension. The participant has 10 percent of wages auto-
matically deposited by the employer each month into an indi-
82 The text of Section II of this Article is drawn largely from the writings and
testimony of Dr. Jose Pinera, architect of the Chilean privately-managed defined
contribution scheme and the leading advocate of privatization of PAYG pension
systems. See, e.g., Jose Pinera, Empowering Workers: The Privatization of Social
Security in Chile, 15 CATO J. (1995/1996); Empowering People Before the Subcomm.
on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong.
(June 25, 1997) (LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File) (statement of Jose Pinera,
President, Int'l Ctr. for Pension Reform; Co-Chairman, Cato Project on Soc. Sec.
Privatization) [hereinafter Testimony of Jose Pinera].
' See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *3.
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vidual PSA. The participant may contribute an additional 10
percent of wages per month as a form of voluntary savings,
which is also deductible from taxable income. Further, the
participant has the option to choose one of several privately-
managed pension fund administration companies ("AFPs") to
manage his or her PSA.' Chile's PSA system covers both pub-
lic and private sector employees, except for police and military
forces, while pensions are built into their pay and working
conditions system. Finally, not only are all employees legally
required to have a PSA, but self-employed individuals are
permitted to join the system as well."
C. Pension Fund Administration Companies
The AFPs are regulated and supervised by the Superinten-
dency of Pension Fund Administrators, with one administrator
acting as a regulatory authority for each pension fund.86 The
AFPs are subject to government regulation intended to guaran-
tee a diversified and low-risk portfolio and to prevent fraud or
embezzlement. The AFPs each operate the equivalent of a
mutual fund that invests pension funds in stocks, bonds, and
government debt obligations. The government regulations
establish only maximum percentage limits for specific types of
instruments and the overall asset mix of the portfolio, the
intent being that such regulations will be scaled back over
time as the AFPs gain experience. The AFPs are not required
to invest any funds in government bonds or other types of debt
instruments. The AFPs may also invest in relatively less risky
and liquid financial instruments in the international markets,
which in part serves as a buffer if there are sudden outflows of
dollars when foreign institutional investors operating in Chile
dispose of Chilean financial assets. In addition to the above,
the AFP entity and the mutual fund it administers are legally
required to be separate entities, so failure of the AFP does not
affect the assets of the mutual fund. Participants may change
from one AFP to another, which stimulates competition among
companies to provide higher returns, better customer service,
84 See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *3.
, See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *4-5.
86 See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *4.
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and lower fees and commissions. Moreover, participants receive
a passbook from the respective AFP detailing the amount accu-
mulated in their accounts and statements every three months
presenting detailed information on their retirement accounts.
Finally, the returns on PSAs are tax free, and when the
amount is withdrawn upon retirement, the participant must
pay a lower tax depending upon the income tax bracket at the
time of withdrawal.87
D. Government Guarantee
The PSA system also includes a limited government guar-
antee for minimum pensions. Participants contributing to the
PSA for at least twenty years, but whose pension funds at re-
tirement age are below a legally defined "minimum pension,"
receive that pension from the government once the PSA is
depleted. The Chilean government also stands as a "guarantor
of last resort" in case fraud occurs in any of the respective
funds.88
E. Supplemental Benefits
The PSA system further includes benefits such as insur-
ance against premature death or permanent disability. The
AFP provides these services to participants by taking out life
and disability coverage from private life insurance companies.
The coverage is paid for by additional participant contributions
of approximately 2.9 percent of salary, including commissions
to the AFP."9
F. Retirement Benefits
Upon retirement, a participant may choose from two gen-
eral payout options. In the first option, the participant may use
the PSA capital to purchase an annuity from a private life
insurance company. The annuity guarantees a constant month-
ly income for life, indexed for inflation (indexed bonds exist in
87 See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *4.
" See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *5.
" See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *5.
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Chilean capital markets for such investments), and survivors
benefits for the participant's dependents. In the second option,
the participant leaves the PSA capital invested and makes
scheduled withdrawals, subject to limits premised on the life
expectancy of the participant and his or her dependents. If the
participant dies, the remaining funds in the PSA account be-
come part of the participant's estate. In both the first and
second options, the participant may withdraw as a lump sum
the capital in excess of the amount necessary to obtain an
annuity or scheduled withdrawal, up to 70 percent of the
participant's last wages."
G. Observations
The Chilean PSA system eliminates common problems
under the PAYG public pension schemes, particularly with
respect to changing demographics and ageing populations.
Under the PSA system, the working population does not pay
for the retired population. The potential for political conflict
and eventual bankruptcy of the PAYG trust funds is avoided,
and the problem of unfunded pension liabilities is similarly
avoided. In addition, the PSA system is completely indepen-
dent of the company employing the participant, as the PSA is
tied to the participant and not the employer. This contrasts to
company-based private pension systems which generally im-
pose costs on participant employees who leave the company
before a given number of years and sometimes results in the
bankruptcy of the participant's pension funds. Moreover, the
"AFPs must invest pension funds in marketable liquid securi-
ties, the PSAs always have a determinable daily value, and it
is easy to transfer between AFPs. Thus, the PSA system does
not infringe on employment mobility, which may enhance labor
market stability. Finally, the PSA system does not discrimi-
nate between full-time and part-time employees, and many
part-time employees participate in the system."
" Thus, upon retirement, Chilean pension funds provide a lump sum to the
participants (similar to many "provident funds", such as those in East Asia), but
also offer added incentives for retention of part of the funds to be distributed as
pension in later years. See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *5.
"1 See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *6.
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III. TRANSITION FROM PAYG TO CHILEAN MODEL PENSION
SYSTEMS
A. Guidelines for Transition to Private Pension Systems
The transition from PAYG to publicly-regulated, privately-
managed defined contribution systems is becoming a global
trend. Notably, the transition from PAYG to publicly-regulated,
privately-managed pension systems is separate and distinct
from the concept of having the government, itself, managing
investments of pension trust funds in private capital markets.
This proposal, which is currently being debated in the United
States, is clearly problematic on many fronts and is not repre-
sentative of the true privatization process in this respect.2
The components of transition may be somewhat difficult to
implement, however. If the PAYG system is terminated on a
wholesale basis, the implicit pension liabilities of the system
must be made transparent and transferred to the new private
system, which creates a large increase in visible public debt as
a percentage of GDP. If the PAYG system is terminated on a
gradual basis, current pension contributors may have to pay
the pensions of retirees under the PAYG system while making
contributions to their own privately funded system. These
problems may be addressed by reducing the benefits of the
PAYG system at the outset. Thus, although the global shift
from PAYG systems to privately funded systems is very recent,
it has profound implications. The results will include not only
a transformation in pension arrangements but also, more im-
portantly, a revolution in capital markets and corporate gover-
nance.
The method selected to finance the transition to partially
or fully funded pension systems generally depends on the fi-
nancing requirements and the fiscal and macroeconomic situa-
tions in each nation, including debt of the old PAYG systems to
GDP. The ongoing pension reforms in Latin America and other
92 See, e.g., KRZYSZTOF OSTASZEWSKI, PRIVATIZING THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST
FUND? DON'T LET THE GOVERNMENT INVEST (Cato Inst. Soc. Sec. Paper No. 6,
1997). These concerns have been echoed in the testimony of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Federal Reserve Board. See Social Security Before the Task Force on
Soc. Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Budget, 105th Cong. 315 (Nov. 20, 1997) (state-
ment of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.).
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nations illustrate that governments have wide flexibility in the
development of the transition methodology, and that choices
exist as to the distribution of the fiscal burden of reform. The
methods generally used to cover fiscal deficits resulting from
transition and parameters established in the reforms include
changing the mandatory age for eligible participants, integra-
ting or excluding specified occupational groups recognized as
having more generous pension schemes, and recognizing bene-
fits acquired under the old PAYG system. The other critical
parameters to facilitate transition include streamlining exist-
ing pension programs by increasing the retirement age, reduc-
ing benefit entitlements, and narrowing eligibility conditions
for old age and disability pensions.
The Chilean approach to transition is instructive and is
set forth below.
B. The Chilean Approach to Transition
1. Principles of Transition
The Chilean approach to transition incorporated four dis-
tinct principles. First, for participants already receiving public
pensions at the time of transition, the government guaranteed
the continuance of those pensions. Second, the participants
already contributing to a PAYG pension system were given the
option of staying in that system or transferring to the new PSA
system. The participants electing to transfer were given a "rec-
ognition bond" deposited into their new PSAs that pays when
the participant reaches retirement. Third, all new entrants to
the labor market were required to enter the PSA system, and
the government effectively closed the door to new entrants to
the PAYG system. Fourth, since financing the transition is a
complex undertaking, each nation must address this issue
according to its own circumstances.93 Thus, the Chilean meth-
od for financing set forth below may not necessarily represent
the best method; however, given its success, it is certainly
worth reviewing.
" See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *7.
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2. Financing the Transition
With respect to financing the transition, the Chilean tran-
sition from PAYG to its current model was premised on five
interrelated stages of financing the inevitable funding deficits
during the initial stages of transition. First, as the contribution
needed to finance adequate pension levels is generally lower
than the current payroll taxes, a fraction of the difference
between them was used as a temporary transition payroll tax
without reducing net wages or increasing the cost of labor to
the employer (the gradual elimination of that tax was consid-
ered in the original law and, in fact, that happened so that
today it does not exist in Chile). Second, using debt, the transi-
tion cost was shared by future generations. In Chile, nearly 40
percent of the cost has been financed by issuing government
bonds. The government bonds were purchased mainly by AFPs
as part of their portfolios and should be completely redeemed
when the PAYG system participants no longer exist. Third, the
need to finance the transition was a powerful incentive to
reduce unnecessary government spending. Fourth, the in-
creased economic growth that the PSA system engendered sub-
stantially increased tax revenues, resulting in fiscal budget
surpluses in current years. Fifth, in many national fiscal situa-
tions, the public pension obligations may be offset to some
extent by the value of SOEs and other types of assets. In Chi-
le, privatizations represented one means of financing the tran-
sition and also increased efficiency and depoliticized the econo-
my.94 Finally, with respect to the government's implicit liabili-
ty to former participants under the old PAYG system who
presently transferred to the new DCP system, the Chilean
government issued so-called "recognition bonds." The value of
these recognition bonds was an approximation of the present
value of the expected pension benefits participants earned
while contributing to the old PAYG system. 5
" See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *7-8.
'5 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 13-14.
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3. Fiscal Implications of Financing the Transition
The fiscal requirements and future cash flows required to
sustain pension reform approaches are quite difficult to esti-
mate in modern times. In general, the fiscal implications are
complicated in various nations by the ability of participants to
switch between the new and old systems; the status of the new
system as an alternative and not mandatory system; and legal
limitations imposing ceilings on overall government spending.
In Chile, transition financing through recognition bonds was
facilitated during periods of strict budgetary discipline and
overall budget surplus. The pension reform process, coupled
with the onset of severe recession, caused an increase in the
public sector deficit as the payroll tax contributions to the
PAYG system decreased when contributors shifted to the new
privately-managed defined contribution pension system; the
losses were not necessarily netted out by the contributions
made to the private pension system. If the contribution rate to
the new system was set equal to the combined payroll tax,
however, the surplus of the pension plans would arguably have
netted out the increase in public sector deficit. 6
The precise identification of financial resources used to
finance the transition are not inherently cognizable, however,
as Chile simultaneously initiated other significant reforms,
such as privatization, trade and tax reforms, labor market and
financial sector reforms, which impacted the government bud-
get. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether the transition
deficit was financed using budget surpluses, taxes, or govern-
ment debt. This same observation may be true for other na-
tions that introduce pension reform simultaneously with other
significant reforms that impact the fiscal condition. Specifical-
ly, Argentina's use of compensatory pensions as opposed to
recognition bonds provides little evidence for identifying the
source of financing its transition given that the government
may issue debt obligations to obtain revenue for transfers to
the new system.
Notably, the impact of a transition from a PAYG system to
a defined contribution privately-managed pension system simi-
lar to that of Chile on a country's national savings depends
"6 See id. at 14.
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upon the method selected to finance the increase in the deficit
that may result from the reforms. If the deficit is financed
through borrowing and the contribution rate of the new system
is set equal to the combined payroll tax rate of the old PAYG
system, the income of the new system contributors will not be
affected, and their savings will remain unchanged. The in-
creased deficit is generally offset by the increased private sec-
tor surplus in the form of pension plan surpluses (tax pay-
ments become private sector savings). If the deficit is financed
through fiscal consolidation programs, the resulting increase in
public sector savings should result in increased national sav-
ings because the netting effect of private savings would be less
than 100 percent. This method should increase national sav-
ings, although the source of this increase would be the fiscal
consolidation, not necessarily the pension reforms themselves.
C. Cumulative Results of the Chilean System
As of 1997, the PSA system had accumulated AFP funds
in excess of U.S. $30 billion for a nation of 14 million people
and GDP of U.S. $70 billion." More than 90 percent of Chil-
ean workers are affiliated with the PSA system. In addition,
the structural impediments are removed, as the pension sys-
tem no longer depends on the political process. The removal of
politics from the pension system has essentially resulted in the
depoliticization of the economy, as electoral candidates are
permanently aware that Chilean workers/voters will instantly
feel the impact of policy on the PSA system, which creates a
significant political counterbalance to special interest group
pressures. The system has therefore ceased to be a
redistributionist program where different groups compete
against each other in the political arena to determine which
group benefits at the expense of the other. Moreover, the pen-
sion system is not affected by demographic trends, and Chilean
workers have property rights over their pension contribu-
tions.9" As the World Bank recognized in 1994,"9 the Chilean
See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *8.
98 See L. Jacobo Rodriguez, Social Security Privatization in the United States
and the Chilean Experience 9 (written Feb. 20, 1997)
<http'J/www.pensionreform.org/studies/portugal.html>.
11 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS (1994).
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model has funded economic growth and stimulated the devel-
opment of efficient capital markets and institutions. The policy
sequencing decisions of establishing the PSA system first, and
then privatizing large SOEs thereafter, resulted in greater
benefits for the employee-participants who received larger
shares of the wealth created by the privatization process. Since
the PSA system went into effect in 1981, the average real
return on investment among AFPs has been 12 percent per
year, notwithstanding variations in the annual yield of individ-
ual AFPs. The participants, therefore, receive pensions signifi-
cantly higher than under the PAYG system, which required an
extensive payroll tax of approximately 25 percent.'00
The Chilean system has undoubtedly enhanced the devel-
opment of domestic capital markets because it generates a
surplus of funds that must be invested. If pension participant
contributions are a substitute for PAYG payroll taxes, then
new markets for financial assets, particularly government debt
obligations, are established. The funds of the private pension
plans that manage contributor accounts are invested in a wide
variety of financial assets, including government debt obliga-
tions.' ' The critical demonstration of capital market develop-
ment and public acceptance of the PSA system came in 1995,
when all Latin American financial markets suffered from con-
tagion generated by Mexico's de facto devaluation in December
1994-January 1995 ('Tequila Effect"). The decline in the Chil-
ean stock market that year produced the only period where the
PSA system suffered a net negative return, declining 2.5 per-
cent. The experience of 1995 demonstrated the resilience of the
Chilean system and illustrated the macroeconomic stability
generated by the system. The then-finance minister of Argenti-
na, Domingo Cavallo, articulated that the only reason that
Chilean financial markets did not suffer dramatic negative
returns during the Tequila Effect period was because of the
private pension system.' 2 Finally, the Chilean system dem-
onstrates that private pension schemes may raise the aggre-
100 See Testimony of Jose Pinera, supra note 82, at *8.
"o See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 13.
See Political and Social Effects in Chile of that Country's Pension System
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (statement of Mark M. Klugmann, Director, Int'l Ctr.
for Pension Reform).
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gate national savings rate. Thus, the resulting success of the
Chilean model is the linkage of pension funds to the capital
markets, creating a market driven as much by domestic funds
as by foreign institutional investors.
D. Pension Reform in Latin America
Latin America is generally recognized as the leading re-
gion in pension reform. After the perceived success of the Chil-
ean transition from a PAYG system to a publicly-regulated,
privately-managed defined contribution pension system, seven
other nations in Latin America reformed their pension sys-
tems. °3 Although none of these pension reform methodologies
were exactly alike, the common principle underlying all of
them was the expanded role for partially or fully funded pri-
vately managed pension plans. The design of the parameters of
these new systems generally depended upon notable differen-
tials between nations, such as the political climate for reform,
the fiscal and monetary conditions, and the financial viability
of the respective pension systems. The reform efforts and re-
sults differ as per the size and maturity of the public pension
systems.
Specifically, in 1993 through 1994, Peru and Colombia
introduced privately-managed defined contribution systems as
alternatives to the existing public pension systems. The struc-
ture of the new private systems in Peru and Colombia includes
decentralized private fund management companies with the
single purpose of managing retirement funds. The design and
structure of these systems closely follow the Chilean mod-
el.'0 4 The new pension models introduced in Argentina and
Uruguay in 1994 and 1996, respectively, are combinations of
the PAYG system supplemented by mandatory funded second
pillars that closely follow the Chilean model, consisting of a
103 In the early to mid-1990s, seven Latin American nations initiated structural
pension reforms. The first of these reforms was undertaken by Peru in 1993, Co-
lombia and Argentina followed in 1994, Mexico in 1995, Uruguay in 1996, Bolivia
in 1997, and most recently El Salvador in 1998. See Monika Queisser, The Second-
Generation Pension Reforms in Latin America, in AGEING WORKING PAPERS: MAIN-
TAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY: THE OECD STUDY ON THE POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING, Ageing Working Paper 5.4, at 25 (1998).
1.. See id. at 26 & Annexes 1 (Peru) & 2 (Colombia).
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system of privately-managed individual pension accounts.'
Mexico enacted pension reform laws in 1996 and the new de-
fined contribution pension system similar to the Chilean model
was initiated in September 1997 with mandatory affiliation of
all dependent private sector workers. The new system consists
of fully funded individual pension accounts, and the old PAYG
system is closed to new entrants.' 6 Bolivia enacted pension
reforms in November 1996, and the new system consists of
fully funded individual defined contribution accounts. The
Bolivian system incorporates many of the components of the
Chilean model but combines privatization (the "capitalisation"
scheme) and pension reform to transfer SOEs to private inves-
tors.0 7 Finally, El Salvador introduced pension reform legis-
lation in December 1996, but financial sector crises delayed
introduction of the new system until the end of 1997. Upon
consideration of all Latin American pension reforms in the
1990s, the system adopted in El Salvador most closely resem-
bles the Chilean model. By March 1998, five fund management
companies were authorized to conduct pension invest-
ments. '
Thus, the nations of Uruguay, Bolivia, El Salvador, and
Mexico have adopted laws that will reform their public pension
systems on par with the Chilean model. Mexico, Bolivia, and
El Salvador closed their PAYG systems and replaced them
with mandatory private funded systems. Peru, Colombia,
Argentina, and Uruguay, along with Hungary and Poland,
have added voluntary private funded systems to their PAYG
systems. In addition to the accumulation of capital, the new
privately managed/funded systems have achieved higher rates
of return, have been widely accepted by younger workers, and
have had a powerful impact on the development of capital
markets.
Latin American pension reforms were not implemented
without controversy and compromise, however. Notwithstand-
ing Chilean reforms in 1981, Argentina and Uruguay by the
1990s had highly mature PAYG systems with increasing de-
'o See id. at 27 & Annexes 3 (Argentina) & 4 (Uruguay).
106 See id. at 31 & Annex 5.
107 See id. at 33 & Annex 6.
100 See Queisser, supra note 103, at 34 & Annex 7.
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pendency ratios and deteriorating ratios of contributors to
affiliates, resulting in growing deficits in the existing pension
systems. These nations also experienced budget deficits at the
time of transition; therefore, transition to a fully funded sys-
tem was unfeasible. The political opposition to transition, such
as trade unions and pension associations favoring the PAYG
system, resulted in much political compromise in adopting new
systems.
10 9
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, conversely, had less mature
pension systems originally established as partially funded
systems, the reserves of which were decreasing rapidly due to
generous benefit eligibility conditionality, high expenditures,
and evasion of contributions, not ageing populations. These
nations each established new funded pension systems with
individual accounts managed by the private sector and pos-
sessed various similarities to the Chilean system. The political
opposition in implementing pension reform in these nations,
however, was significant."0 Thus, due to resistance of trade
unions, the social insurance bureaucracy and other special
interests, the new pension schemes adopted in Peru and Co-
lombia were adopted only as voluntary alternatives, not man-
datory replacements, for the existing PAYG public pension
systems. Moreover, while Mexico managed to adopt a mandato-
ry system for all private sector workers, the reforms are incom-
plete as public sector workers still enjoy the older, more gener-
ous, benefits system."'
Interestingly, Bolivia implemented a scheme combining
pension reform with the privatization and capitalization of
state-owned enterprises. Specifically, the PAYG system was
terminated, and all affiliates were automatically transferred to
a privately-managed system with individual pension accounts.
Simultaneously, a universal pension was established and all
persons 21 years of age or older receive entitlements upon
reaching the age of 65. The pension is financed using a "collec-
tive capitalization fund" containing proceeds from the
government's sale of 50 percent of SOE shares for capitaliza-
tion purposes. The fund is managed by management companies
1 See id. at 9-10 & Annexes 3, 4.
n See id. at 10 & Annexes 1, 2, & 5.
.. See id. at 10 & Annex 5.
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and is subject to the same investment regulations as pension
funds, thus purportedly reducing opportunities for abusive
discretionary investment decisions by the government."'
With respect to financing the transition from PAYG sys-
tems, the Chilean approach in issuing recognition bonds to
facilitate the financing of the transition was also used in Co-
lombia and Peru. Argentina selected a compensatory approach
for recognition of past contributions to the old PAYG system,
with benefit payouts made by the public PAYG element and
financed from current contributions and budgetary transfers
represented by specially established taxes. The approach used
by Argentina represents the desire to avoid undertaking addi-
tional public debt as well as to reduce cash flow pressures on
the government. In rendering monthly payouts instead of re-
deeming recognition bonds as participants retire, the financial
burden is extended over a longer period which reduces cash
flow pressures."' In Uruguay, there is no de facto compensa-
tion for acquired rights, but all old benefit entitlements are
rendered through payouts from the PAYG element. This ar-
rangement will continue to provide the majority of pension
payments, as the new system is limited in size and cover-
age." 4 In Mexico, there is no compensation for acquired
rights, but workers obtain an option to switch, in that workers
approaching retirement are permitted to compare their benefit
entitlements under the new and old PAYG systems and select
the option with more advantageous consequences."' If the
option for public benefits is selected, the balance accumulated
in the individual pension account is transferred to the public
system.'16
E. Overview of Private Pension Systems
The advantages of private pension systems generally in-
clude (1) empowering the individual to make greater provision
for their retirement in savings vehicles; (2) encouraging long-
term savings in vehicles that have restrictions on early access;
112 See id. at 10 & Annex 6.
1 See Queisser, supra note 103, at 11 & Annex 3.
' See id. at 11 & Annex 4.
... See id. at 11 & Annex 5.
116 See id. at 11 & Annex 5.
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(3) introducing retirement income provisions where the bene-
fits are generally fully funded and the level of benefits is pri-
marily determined by the earnings on prior contributions; and
(4) raising the level of national savings and the capacity of the
nation to provide investment capital for continuing economic
growth.1
7
While there are a number of OECD nations where private
pension systems represent important components of the total
retirement payout system, the form of private pension system
components and their relationship to public pension systems
varies widely. For example, the private pension system compo-
nents may be limited to particular occupational groups, man-
dated for mostly all employees, or may supplement public pen-
sion schemes or otherwise serve as a substitute therefor. Pri-
vate pension system components usually involve some form of
government tax subsidy and regulatory protection."' In addi-
tion, the majority of private pension system components, which
are generally defined benefit rather than defined contribution
plans, in effect have the following characteristics: (1) they are
generally premised on voluntary and not mandatory contribu-
tions; (2) the age of eligibility for final benefits is generally
lower than for public pensions; (3) they are generally fully
funded; (4) they are mixed between defined benefit and defined
contribution schemes; (5) the respective governments provide
tax incentives; and (6) they generally serve as supplements to
public pension schemes." 9
Although private pension system components vary tremen-
dously among nations, the common framework is that the
second tier of most national pension systems is the occupation-
al or employer-sponsored pension plan. In some nations, these
plans are established on an industry-wide basis (France). In
other nations, they are established with active government
involvement in regulation and supervision of investment proce-
dures and in parameters such as benefits and rates (Israel). In
117 See Kalisch & Aman, supra note 7, at 13.
11 See id.
... See id. at 14.
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many nations the employer-sponsored pensions are maintained
through the government's role in acting as implicit or explicit
guarantor of the contributors' rights and benefits. 20
In addition to the above, the legal and regulatory frame-
works and insurance requirements of private pension systems
also differ considerably among OECD nations. The issue of
pension plan governance has critical implications for partici-
pant confidence in their plan and for the plan's utilization as
an alternative to private savings. The regulations establishing
the parameters of private pension system components, particu-
larly those governing vesting or portability, also differ widely
among nations. The vesting requirement is a critical feature of
private pension schemes, and in many nations the time period
for partial or full vesting is quite long.'2 ' Finally, funding re-
quirements for private pension systems vary widely among
nations. For instance, some classes of employers are not re-
quired to account for likely future wage increases in deter-
mining the required pension reserves. The degree of funding is
also determined using the same degree of flexibility permitted
in the selection of actuarial assumptions.
Lastly, the tax treatment of private pension components is
critically important with respect to their design and size. The
standard practice is to exempt contributions from taxation up
to a certain level, and some nations provide similar treatment
to contributions made to certain individual retirement plans
(e.g., U.S.-IRA and Canada-registered retirement savings plan
("RRSP")). Some nations provide a limited tax exemption to
pension income (Australia), but most pensions are subject to
taxation."2 In the U.S., changes in the tax treatment of cer-
tain individual retirement accounts permit both accrued tax
deferral treatment and exempt realized withdrawals from
income taxation upon retirement."
120 See id. at 14.
121 See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 15-16.
' See id. at 16.
12 See id. at 30-32.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: NECESSARY AND
APPROPRIATE?
The OECD and other multilateral organizations have en-
deavored to measure the results of recent pension reforms in
Latin America and other global regions, and the results for
both governments and pension participants have been general-
ly positive. The most significant reform/endeavor in this re-
spect would be the facilitation of market-driven investing by
private sector entities of publicly-regulated, privately-managed
private defined contribution funds in financial instruments
other than government debt obligations. The primary means by
which to facilitate and justify wholesale transition from PAYG
systems, investing in government debt obligations by govern-
ment trust funds or simply funded from tax revenues, to the
investment of pension funds in non-government financial in-
struments by private sector entities is to facilitate the devel-
opment and implementation of international regulatory and
supervisory standards for private pension systems. The interna-
tional standards may be developed and implemented in similar
format to the "best practices" and "core principles" adopted
over the past decade for international banks and securities
firms by the Basle Committee and the IOSCO Technical Com-
mittee and Working Groups, respectively. The Basle Commit-
tee and IOSCO are multilateral organizations of regulatory
and supervisory authorities from various nations that have
established best practices and core principles in many areas
through a consensus process primarily influenced by the G-7
nations. The participant nations generally recognize the con-
sensus documents as "soft law" and thereafter adopt them in
some form as legislation or regulations in their respective legal
frameworks. The Basle Committee and IOSCO only recently
issued a formal decree to "join forces" in certain respects to
address institutions and practices that necessarily involved the
"soft law jurisdictions" of each set of constituencies, such as
derivatives instruments, disclosure of trading practices, and
the like. The Basle Committee-IOSCO consensus process has
generally reached positive results, coupled with the develop-
ment of guidance in several areas of technical expertise by
committees of the Bank for International Settlements. This
"soft law" process has gained relative strength in the midst of
1998]
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several major banking and currency crises, particularly with
respect to East Asia. Specifically, the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") has formally incorporated as part of the "condi-
tionality" attaching to IMF credit and guarantee facilities, the
requirement that borrowing nations agree to pursue and adopt
certain of the "best practices" and "core principles" into their
respective legal framework. Although not perfect, the Basle
Committee-IOSCO consensus process has been highly success-
ful in bringing difficult financial law issues that often go to the
heart of powerful political interests into the open forum for
debate and guidance.
The consensus process may be extended to the pension
reform arena, particularly with respect to nations that do not
have large, mature PAYG systems already in place and are on
the verge of financial unsustainability, although certain of the
international standards would certainly be applicable to the
large G-7 nations themselves. The consensus process would
necessarily focus on developing international regulatory and
supervisory standards for the investment of defined contribu-
tion funds by private sector entities, similar to the Chilean
model. The issues of appropriate transition approaches and
methods to finance the inevitable deficits arising from transi-
tion are better left to the nations themselves. However, it
should be emphasized that given the macroeconomic implica-
tions of one or more larger nations undertaking a gradual or
immediate transition, such transition would certainly have
uncertain economic repercussions on both the global economy
and individual nations. Therefore, these issues should certain-
ly be addressed in larger political or macroeconomic forums
such as the G-7 or multilateral committee involving the World
Bank and IMF, respectively.
A. International Standards: The Starting Point
The best starting point for developing international regula-
tory and supervisory standards should begin with the true
experts on investment funds and investment fund operators,
which on the multilateral forum would be the IOSCO Techni-
cal Committee. The envisioned regulatory and supervisory
framework could be initiated principally from guidance recent-
ly issued by IOSCO regarding the regulation and supervision
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of collective investment schemes ("CIS"),"2 or "mutual funds"
in U.S. parlance, and their operational management, respec-
tively. In particular, the IOSCO Technical Committee in Sep-
tember 1997 promulgated such guidance in a document enti-
tled, Principles for the Supervision of Operators of Collective
Investment Schemes."R This document sets forth ten princi-
ples for the regulation and supervision of CIS operators and
provides commentary on those principles.
In 1995, the IOSCO Technical Committee published the
Principles for the Regulation of Collective Investment Schemes.
There are two CIS principles in this document which address
the regulation and supervision of CIS operators and set forth
minimum standards for conduct and supervision of CIS. First,
CIS principle 3, Eligibility to Act as an Operator, addresses the
regulatory authority's role in imposing minimum eligibility
standards of conduct that require approval by the authority
prior to commencement of a CIS. The minimum standards
include among other things (1) operator-specific powers and
duties (administrative procedures and the duty to make deci-
sions as to the investment portfolio structure) and (2) compli-
ance with strictly defined standards set by the authority. Sec-
ond, CIS principle 5, Supervision, provides that a regulatory
and supervisory framework must provide for a regulatory au-
thority to take overall responsibility for the supervision of CIS
within its jurisdiction and addresses supervisory techniques
including registration and authorization, inspections and inves-
tigations, and regulatory authority powers. Thus, the IOSCO
Technical Committee issued the September 1997 guidance on
the regulation and supervision of CIS operators to address
these fundamental CIS principles. The fundamental objectives
of the international standards for private pension funds under
"' A CIS is defined by ("IOSCO") as "an open-ended collective investment
scheme that issues redeemable units and invests primarily in transferable securi-
ties or money market instruments" and thus excludes schemes investing in real
estate, mortgages, or venture capital. IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., IOSCO, PRINCI-
PLES FOR THE REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES (1995) (on file
with author).
n See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION
OF OPERATORS OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES (1997) (on file with author)
[hereinafter CIS OPERATOR PRINCIPLES].
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the Chilean example should model the safeguards inherent in
the objectives set forth in the.IOSCO CIS guidance, principally
investor protection and operator integrity.
The following sets forth a limited regulatory and supervi-
sory framework through which international standards for
fund operators could be adopted by a multilateral committee
drawing upon expertise from various institutions, perhaps
including the World Bank, IMF, and IOSCO, at the outset.
B. International Regulatory and Supervisory Standards for
Chilean Model Private Pension Systems
1. Pension Fund Operator Standards
a. Operator Eligibility
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards of
eligibility qualifications prior to establishing and operating
investment funds. Such standards should apply continuously to
ensure that neither changes in the management, nor adminis-
trative organization of an operator, nor delegation of functions
to third parties, lead to lesser degrees of investor protection
than that which is presumed at the inception of the fund oper-
ator.
b. Conduct of Business26
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
to ensure that they meet high standards of competence, integ-
rity, and fair dealing in their conduct with regard to pension
investment business and that any investment transactions
undertaken on behalf of the fund that present the operator
with a conflict of interest are limited, properly disclosed, and
not inconsistent with investor protection. These minimum
standards should ensure that the fund has been treated fairly
by the operator and that the operator has not unduly benefited
from transactions to the detriment of the fund. These stan-
dards would address issues such as timely and best execution
126 See id. at 6-8.
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of transactions; timely and fair allocation of transactions;
avoidance of churning practices; avoidance of unauthorized
rebates of commissions from transactions in dealings with
other financial institutions; and other "soft dollar" practices
(whereby operators enter into agreements with other
counterparties to pay for services for the operator in return for
brokering business that will generate an understood or agreed
level of commission).
c. Connected Party Transactions27
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
to ensure that appropriate protective arrangements, including
"Chinese Walls" and other firewall safeguards, are in place to
limit and disclose any conflicts of interest between operator
and fund and operator dealings with other fund operators,
banks, securities firms and other financial and political institu-
tions that may be "connected parties." The standards would
also establish limitations on fund participation in certain
events such as underwriting and participation in IPOs and
procedures to ensure that operator employees do not make
transactions for their own account, or for the account of the
operator, that conflict with the operator's obligations to the
fund. These minimum standards should collectively eliminate
opportunities for conflicts of interest and unethical transac-
tions not in the best interests of the pension participants. In
addition, minimum standards should be developed for the
disclosure of, and exercise of, rights acquired through fund in-
vestments, such as voting rights within equities and other
financial instruments.
d. Valuation of Fund Assets28
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
to ensure that all property of the fund is fairly and accurately
valued and that the fund's net asset value and the value of
investor accounts are correctly determined. The minimum
standards should require such accurate valuations on a daily
' See id. at 8-10.
128 See id. at 10-12.
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basis, and the information should be freely available to the
fund investors. The valuation methodology of investments
should be disclosed to investors if operators are permitted to
engage in off-exchange or OTC transactions. The accounting
conventions for valuation of investments and collection of in-
come therefrom should be subject to minimum standards, such
as the international accounting standards set forth by the
International Accounting Standards Committee ("IASC").
e. Safekeeping and Segregation of Investments'29
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
to ensure that fund assets are properly held in safekeeping and
segregated from the assets of management and other entities.
In other words, investor assets must remain separate and
distinct from the assets of the fund operator, and the invest-
ment fund entity itself must be separate and distinct from the
fund operator. The standards should require the appointment
of a custodian to hold the assets or be in a position to ensure
their safekeeping. In addition, the minimum standards should
require a supervisory function mandating that investment rec-
onciliations are conducted to ensure that the fund assets held
by the custodian reconcile with the portfolio managed by the
operator.
f. Investment Standards130
The fund operator should be subject to minimum stan-
dards to. ensure that the investment policies of the fund are
followed and that any restrictions on the type or level of in-
vestment are complied with. The investment policies of the
fund, including the investment objectives and risk profile, are
critical for the participant's decision to invest in a particular
fund. In addition, the fund operator should be subject to mini-
mum standards on investment and borrowing restrictions to
ensure investment diversification, eliminate opportunities for
undue leverage, and mitigate opportunities to purchase unusu-
ally risky securities and off-exchange financial instruments.
129 See id. at 12-13.
13- See CIS OPERATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 125, at 13-14.
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g. Fees and Administrative Expenses"'
The fund operator should be subject to minimum stan-
dards that ensure that investors are charged only for those
fees and expenses that are agreed to by contract and that such
expenses are made on reasonable terms fully disclosed to the
participants. The nature and amount of such fees and expenses
should be limited by law and charged on a fully transparent
basis.
h. Internal Controls and Fund Compliance.2
The fund operator should be subject to minimum stan-
dards to ensure that internal controls are in force and that
compliance arrangements exist that ensure sufficient diligence,
effectiveness, fairness, and honest dealings. These minimum
standards would require that internal audit and monitoring ar-
rangements exist to mitigate opportunities for fraud, negli-
gence, or policy failures. The supervisory functions would in-
clude routine on-site and off-site examinations and inspections
by the supervisory authority to ensure compliance in this re-
spect.
i. Transparency and Disclosure...
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
that ensure all documentation issued by the operator to fund
investors and supervisory authorities (examinations and in-
spections) is transparent, comprehensible, consistent, and not
otherwise misleading. These minimum standards should apply
to fund offering documentation, financial statements, and con-
tinuing disclosures of material and nonmaterial information to
investors and authorities.
3' See id. at 14-15.
132 See id. at 15.
33 See id. at 16.
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j. Accounts and Recordkeeping1 3 4
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
to ensure that appropriate accounts and records are main-
tained regarding fund assets, transactions, relationships and
investor accounts.
2. Private Pension System Design Standards.
In addition to international regulatory and supervisory
standards for pension fund operators, additional standards
could be developed regarding issues particular to private pen-
sion system design, such as the following categories:
a. Actuarial Valuation Procedures and Assumptions
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
regarding their use of actuarial valuation procedures and as-
sumptions regarding pension payouts to investors under differ-
ent scenarios in order to provide investors with a clear and
accurate real-time assessment as to their projected pension
benefits upon reaching retirement age.
b. Insurance Requirements and Rights to Survivorship
Fund operators should be subject to minimum standards
with respect to designing collective disability and health insur-
ance provisions for fund participants. In addition, fund opera-
tors should be subject to minimum standards for delineation of
rights of survivorship to the fund participant's pension plan.
c. Privately-Managed Pension System Parameters
Finally, international standards could also be designed
regarding the parameters of the privately-managed defined
contribution pension systems to ensure that pension partici-
pants are protected by government standards with limited
opportunity for undue government interference and political
conflict. Thus, international standards could be developed for
- See id. at 17.
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the system parameters to include (1) the provision of a limited
government guarantee against insolvency of private pension
funds; (2) standard categories of participant requirements,
such as retirement age and the like, to limit opportunities for
unfair distributions of entitlements and benefits; (3) in accor-
dance with the Chilean model, a minimum pension for pension
participants in the event of fund performance below a standard
benchmark; (4) standards for vesting requirements and porta-
bility of pension accounts between investments; (5) investment
of pension funds by private entities not subject to political
interference and influence; (6) guidelines for responsibility for
contributions (standard percentages of required contribution
for participants); (7) supplementary funding requirements by
the government coupled with capital adequacy requirements
for the fund to ensure liquidity and solvency in times of mar-
ket distress; and (8) tax incentives to maximize investment
fund performance and retirement payouts, such as universal
tax deferral on investor gains within their respective portfolios.
CONCLUSION
Thus, developing and transition nations must take swift
action to remediate the financial deterioration of their pension
systems instead of waiting for their systems to disintegrate.
The key factor is that the longer nations wait to implement
reform, the more expensive becomes the transition to new
systems. The political debate of predictably special interest
groups must be rendered as secondary objectives to the main-
tenance of income security and safety of current pension par-
ticipants and the soundness of current pension systems.
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